


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A Representative Committee by Approval Balloting.

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A representative committee by approval balloting¹

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Abstract

A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of representatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to represent all of voters in at least the same proportion. This property is a way of selecting a committee that represents completely all of voters when such a committee exists. The usual voting rules in this context do not satisfy this condition.

Keywords: Approval balloting, committee election, unanimity, justified representation, representativeness

JEL: D71, D72

1. Introduction

The problem of selecting a representative committee has been widely studied. In fact, there are several approaches to this problem in the literature. Much of the known multi-winner rules are based on the assumption that voters have totally ordered preferences regarding the candidates.

In contrast, this paper focuses on approval-based rules by which voters have dichotomous preferences (each voter sorts the candidates as either *good* or *bad*). Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn, 1978; Fishburn and Brams,

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1981) is an appealing procedure for single-winner elections whenever voters have dichotomous preferences. Voters approve as many candidates as they wish (Approval Balloting), and the candidate with the most approvals wins. Approval Voting is known to fulfill many good properties when voters have dichotomous preferences. Recently, in Gehrlein and Lepelley (2015), different scenarios using both types of preferences (dichotomous and complete orders) have been analyzed in order to compare Approval Voting with other scoring rules.

Approval balloting is also useful in committee elections where a subset of candidates should be selected. There are different ways of aggregating approval ballots in order to choose a committee of size s . Kilgour (2010) and Kilgour and Marshall (2012) surveyed methods using approval ballots in multi-winner elections. Some of them are generalizations of the Approval Voting procedure; others are related to threshold or centralization procedures, where representativeness plays a more significant role. Besides *Approval Voting* (AV), other interesting procedures are *Representativeness* (Monroe, 1995; Potthoff and Brams, 1998), *Proportional Approval* (PAV) (Simmons, 2001; Thiele, 1890), *Threshold-Majority* (Fishburn and Pekeč, 2004), *Minimax Approval voting* (MAV) (Kilgour et al., 2006), *Satisfaction Approval* (SAV) (Brams and Kilgour, 2010), etc.

Some of the proposed rules present a lack of representativeness, suffering from what is known as the *tyranny of the majority* (50'01% of the voters could determine the selected committee, leaving almost half of the voters without representation). When the goal is to choose a committee that represents the greatest number of voters this lack of representativeness is an important handicap.

Monroe (1995) and Elkind et al. (2014) propose examples where representation is a focal objective. Although they use a non dichotomous approach, their examples (the selection of a set of newspapers for a graduate common room (Monroe, 1995), or the selection of movies for a long-distance flight (Elkind et al., 2014)) are clear situations in which having a representative for the greatest number of voters would be the main goal and the information about the preferences might be dichotomous in a natural way. Committees that are constituted, not to make final decisions (where the committee should be a reflection of the electorate) but rather to elaborate pre-proposals where each voter's opinion should be considered, are rather common. This paper focuses on such types of contexts, where the goal is to select committees that

represent the largest number of voters.

Sometimes, in order to ensure some representation using dichotomous preferences, restrictions are established on the admissible ballots to ensure more representative committees². Nevertheless, in line with approval balloting philosophy, a modification in the process of aggregating ballots would be more adequate than a limitation on voters' opinions.

In recent works, Aziz et al. (2015), Aziz and Walsh (2014) and Sánchez-Fernández et al. (2016) study new properties related to representativeness: Justified Representation (JR), Extended Justified Representation (EJR), Proportional Justified Representation (PJR), among others. Justified Representation is the weakest of these conditions and it should be a necessary requirement when representation of the different opinions of the voters is important. Justified Representation ensures that a large group of voters with shared preferences should have at least one representative allocated to them. Aziz et al. (2015) show that most of the standard approval-based multi-winners rules do not satisfy JR and, for some of them, they propose natural modifications to overcome this lack of representation.

In this work we investigate a new axiom related with representation, which we call α -unanimity. The idea is that when there is a committee that represents all of the voters (in a given proportion α), then the selected committee has to represent all of the voters in at least the same proportion. We think that in the afore-mentioned context, where the main objective is to select a committee that represents the greatest number of voters, it is indeed an appealing property. As far as we know, none of the standard approval-based multi-winners rules hold α -unanimity for positive values of α . We define a new voting rule, the *Lexi-unanimous Approval Voting rule* (LUAV), which holds α -unanimity. This rule allows us to achieve the broadest degree of consensus and to choose a committee in which, if possible, all the voters are represented. We prove that the LUAV rule also satisfies JR.

²For the elections to the Senate of Spain (The Upper House of the Spanish Parliament) each province elects four senators regardless of their population. In order to obtain a more representative committee, under current legislation, each voter should mark up to three candidates' names.

2. Preliminaries

We assume throughout this paper that $n > 1$ and $k > 1$ are the numbers of voters and candidates, respectively, and we denote the set of voters by N and the set of candidates by K .

An approval ballot is a binary k -vector $v = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k) \in \{0, 1\}^k$ where the value 1 or 0 for v_i indicates the approval or disapproval, respectively, of candidate i . For each $v = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k) \in \{0, 1\}^k$, $|v| = \sum_{i=1}^k v_i$ indicates the number of approved candidates in the ballot v .

An approval ballot profile is a vector $V = (v^1, v^2, \dots, v^n) \in \{0, 1\}^{nk}$ where $v^j \in \{0, 1\}^k$, $j \in N$, is the voter j 's approval ballot.

Although we sometimes use the candidates' numbers to denote a committee, it can also be represented by a binary vector $C = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k) \in \{0, 1\}^k$ where the value 1 or 0 for c_i , $i \in K$, indicates whether candidate i is or not a member of the committee C . We also use $i \in C$ to denote that candidate i is in the committee C . As before $|C| = \sum_{i=1}^k c_i$ denotes the number of members in this committee. For any approval ballot v and any committee C , $vC = \sum_{i=1}^k v_i c_i$ denotes how many candidates in committee C are approved in the ballot v . For any two ballots v and w , $v \odot w = (v_1 w_1, v_2 w_2, \dots, v_k w_k)$ represents the agreement between ballots v and w and then $|\odot_{j \in N} v^j|$ indicates the number of candidates approved by all voters.

We denote by ξ the set of feasible committees, and by ϑ the set of admissible ballots. In general, $\xi \subseteq \{0, 1\}^k \setminus \{\vec{0}\}$ and $\vartheta \subseteq \{0, 1\}^k \setminus \{\vec{0}\}$. It seems reasonable that the selected committee must contain at least one candidate. On the other hand, blank ballots will not be considered for the aggregation procedure. In most cases there are other a priori restrictions on these sets and they can not be the whole set $\{0, 1\}^k \setminus \{\vec{0}\}$. A typical restriction on ξ is that only committees of a given size are possible. In this case, we will denote by ξ_s the set of committees with exactly s members.

Ballot restrictions are often imposed in fixed-size committee elections. Usual examples are when ballots that name more than a prefixed number of candidates are discarded. We are not going to consider ballot restrictions because they mask the fact that the election is conducted under approval balloting. Nevertheless, in contexts where this kind of restrictions exists our proposal could be applied without modifications.

Representational requirements are also very usual (balanced representation of men and women, representation from different geographical regions, representation from different faculties or departments, etc.). These representational requirements are usually guaranteed by restricting the set of admissible committees (Kilgour, 2010; Fishburn and Pekeč, 2004).

In general, an approval-based committee election problem can be represented as $(N, K, \vartheta \subseteq \{0, 1\}^k \setminus \{\vec{0}\}, \xi \subseteq \{0, 1\}^k \setminus \{\vec{0}\})$. A voting rule in this context is a function, possibly multi-valued, $\psi : \vartheta^n \rightarrow \xi$, where $C^V \in \psi(V)$ represents an elected committee when $V \in \vartheta^n$ is the approval ballot profile proposed by the voters. Whenever the voting rule does not uniquely select a committee, we suppose that ties are broken according to a pre-fixed priority order over the admissible committees.

As afore-mentioned, the size of the elected committee is a common restriction usually established in advance. We are going to focus on this particular context, in which the family of feasible committees is ξ_s , $1 \leq s < k$. Moreover we do not restrict the voters' opinions, so $\vartheta = \{0, 1\}^k \setminus \{\vec{0}\}$. In this case we call the voting rule the s -committee voting rule.

Given a ballot profile $V = (v^1, v^2, \dots, v^n)$, for any candidate $i \in K$ its approval score is the number of voters approving candidate i , that is, $App(V, i) = \sum_{j=1}^n v_i^j$. A natural way to use approval ballots to select a committee is to choose the committee $C \in \xi$ maximizing $\sum_{i \in C} App(V, i)$. This rule, which has been adopted by several academic and professional societies, is known as *Simple Approval Voting* (AV) and it is an obvious generalization of Approval Voting for a single winner. Since AV for single-winner elections has been widely studied and it has appealing properties, a desirable property for committee selection rules is that, when applied to the particular case $s = 1$, it selects a candidate who wins under approval voting.

Definition 1. (Kilgour and Marshall, 2012) *An s -committee voting rule is approval-based if and only if when $s = 1$ it selects the candidates who win in single-winner Approval Voting.*

Not all the committee selection rules defined in the literature are based on Approval Voting (see Kilgour and Marshall (2012)).

When a committee of size $s > 1$ has to be selected, as commented, properties on representativeness may be crucial and it is known that the voting

rules in the literature may generate outcomes that are highly unrepresentative of the electorate. Within this approach Aziz et al. (2015) study an interesting property.

Definition 2. (Aziz et al., 2015) A committee C of size s provides justified representation for the approval-based committee election problem (N, K, ϑ, ξ_s) if there does not exist a set of voters $N^* \subseteq N$ with $|N^*| \geq \frac{n}{s}$ such that $|\odot_{j \in N^*} v^j| \geq 1$ and $v^j C = 0$ for all $j \in N^*$. An s -committee voting rule based on approval voting satisfies justified representation (JR) if it selects committees that provide justified representation.

Justified representation is a weak condition establishing that if a subset of voters of a considerable size agree on at least one candidate, the opinion of someone in this group should be taken into account. AV, SAV and PAV voting rules do not fulfil JR (see Aziz et al. (2015)). Aziz et al. (2015) use an algorithm (*Greedy Approval Voting* (GAV)) selecting a committee providing justified representation, proving in this way that such a committee always exists. Aziz et al. (2015) and Sánchez-Fernández et al. (2016) analyze other, more restrictive, types of representation properties but as Sánchez-Fernández et al. (2016) claim, “justified representation is a very interesting axiom, and that it must be a necessary requirement (although not a sufficient one) for considering the use of an approval-based multi-winner voting rule when it is desired that the winning set represents the different opinions or preferences of the agents involved in the election”.

We are interested in voting rules that provide committees that represent the greatest number of voters as possible. In fact, we look for a rule that selects a committee that represents all voters when it exists. The concept of α -unanimity tries to capture this idea. We first define, for each proportion $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, each ballot profile V , and each committee C , the α -agreement level as

$$d_\alpha(V, C) = \left| \left\{ j \in N : \frac{v^j C}{\min(|v^j|, |C|)} \geq \alpha \right\} \right|.$$

The parameter α can be interpreted as the proportion of the committee that should coincide with any voter’s ballot in order to consider that the committee represents the voter. Therefore, α can be seen as the degree of representation required. The extreme cases appear when $\alpha = 0$ (no representation at all) and $\alpha = 1$ (total agreement on the committee). Of course, the larger α is, the more representative the committee will be.

Definition 3. For a fixed $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, we say that committee C is α -unanimous for the voting profile V if $d_\alpha(V, C) = n$.

Then, α -unanimity means that committee C represents all voters at least to the proportion α .

Definition 4. An s -committee voting rule satisfies α -unanimity if, when an α -unanimous committee exists, the procedure selects α -unanimous committees. That is, if there is a committee $S \in \xi_s$ such that $d_\alpha(V, S) = n$, then for any C selected by the voting rule, $d_\alpha(V, C) = n$.

The property of α -unanimity implies that when there is a committee so that all voters agree at least to a proportion α , the selected committee should be also acceptable for all voters to the same degree. Of course, all procedures satisfy 0-unanimity because for every C and V , $d_0(V, C) = n$. On the other hand, for $\alpha = 1$, $d_1(V, S) = n$ means that all voters unanimously agree with committee S , hence it seems reasonable to select a committee with this maximum degree of consensus. Note that when using approval balloting, several committees supported by all the voters may exist. The 1-unanimity is related to the strong unanimity property in Elkind et al. (2014), which conveys that if a committee supported by all the voters exists, the committee selected must therefore be supported by all the voters as well.

GAV committees, which fulfill JR, may not be α -unanimous for positive values of α as the following example shows.

Example 1. Six voters have to choose a committee of two from three candidates. Let $K = \{1, 2, 3\}$. Table 1 shows the approved candidates for each voter.

GAV provides two possible committees $C_1 = \{1, 2\}$ and $C_2 = \{1, 3\}$. Note that α -unanimity is not fulfilled for $\alpha = 0.5$, because $d_{0.5}(V, C) = 6$ when $C = \{2, 3\}$ and $d_{0.5}(V, C_1) = d_{0.5}(V, C_2) = 5$.

In the context described in this work, in order for all voters get some representation, solutions fulfilling α -unanimity for some $\alpha > 0$ would be desirable. Unfortunately, none of the usual voting rules satisfy this property, even for small positive values.

| # Voters | Candidates | | |
|----------|------------|----------|----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 6 | 4 | 3 | 3 |

Table 1: Example 1 ballots profile.

3. Lexiunanimous approval voting rule

To define a voting rule satisfying α -unanimity for positive values of α , we need some previous notation. Although $d_\alpha(V, C)$ can be computed for any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, the quotient

$$\frac{v^j C}{\min(|v^j|, |C|)} \quad (1)$$

can reach only a finite number of values. The reached values depend on s , C and the number of candidates supported by each voter. Given an s -election problem (N, K, ϑ, ξ_s) , let

$$\Lambda_s = \{\alpha \in [0, 1] : \alpha = \frac{r_t}{t}, t = 1, 2, \dots, s; r_t = 0, 1, 2, \dots, t\}.$$

Λ_s is a finite set and contains all the possible values for the quotient (1), and therefore the relevant values of the parameter α . We denote by $\vec{\alpha}_s = (\alpha_j)$ the ordered vector of the different values in Λ_s ($i < j$ if and only if $\alpha_i < \alpha_j$). Note that, for each $\vec{\alpha}_s$, the first coordinate is $\alpha_1 = 0$ and the last coordinate is 1.

For each voters' profile V and each committee C in the s -election problem (N, K, ϑ, ξ_s) , we compute the vector $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$, with the same number of coordinates as $\vec{\alpha}_s$, defined by $U_i^{\alpha_s}(V, C) = d_{\alpha_i}(V, C)$ for all i . It is easy to verify that for each voters' profile V and each committee C , the coordinates of $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ are non-increasing ($i < j$ implies $U_i^{\alpha_s}(V, C) \geq U_j^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$) and, moreover, $U_1^{\alpha_s}(V, C) = n$ (since $\alpha_1 = 0$). These vectors will allow us to define our procedure for s -election problems. We first provide an example.

When selecting a committee of two candidates the possible values of quotient (1) are $0, \frac{1}{2}$ and 1, so $\vec{\alpha}_s = (0, \frac{1}{2}, 1)$. In the particular case of Example

1 the vectors $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ for the ballot profile V and the committees in ξ_2 are displayed in Table 2.

| $C \in \xi_2$ | $\vec{\alpha}_s = (0, \frac{1}{2}, 1)$ | | |
|---------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|
| | $U_1^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ | $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ | $U_3^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ |
| (1, 1, 0) | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| (1, 0, 1) | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| (0, 1, 1) | 6 | 6 | 2 |

Table 2: $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ vectors for Example 1.

Definition 5. *Given an s -election problem (N, K, ϑ, ξ_s) , the Lexiunanimous Approval Voting rule (LUAV) assigns to each ballot profile V any committee C such that $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ is maximum with respect to the lexicographical order.³*

The following result summarizes important properties of the Lexiunanimous Approval Voting rule.

Theorem 1. *The Lexiunanimous Approval Voting rule*

- i) is α -unanimous, for any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$*
- ii) is an approval-based voting rule*
- iii) satisfies JR*

Proof.

- i)* Let $\alpha^* \in [0, 1]$ and suppose there are $S \in \xi_s$ and $V \in \vartheta^n$ such that $d_{\alpha^*}(V, S) = n$. By construction, for each $\alpha' < \alpha^*$, $d_{\alpha'}(V, S) = n$. Let us consider a committee C^L selected with the LUAV rule. Then $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L) \succ_L U^{\alpha_s}(V, S)$. So, $d_{\alpha^*}(V, C^L) = n$ and C^L is an α^* -unanimous committee.

³The lexicographical order is defined as $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) \succ_L (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$ if and only if there is $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$ such that $x_j = y_j$ for all $j < i$ and $x_i > y_i$. The weak relation $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) \succsim_L (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$ means $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) \succ_L (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$ or $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$. Note that being the set of vectors $\{U^{\alpha_s}(V, C) : C \in \xi_s\}$ finite, the lexicographical order always reaches a unique maximum (although several committees may provide this maximum).

- ii) The possible values for α in a single-winner problem are $\alpha = 0$ and $\alpha = 1$. As $d_0(V, i) = n$ for each candidate i , the Lexiunanimous Approval Voting rule selects the candidate with the greatest value $d_1(V, i)$; that is, the candidates receiving the most approval votes.
- iii) Let $C^L \in \xi_s$ be a committee selected with the LUAV rule. Then

$$U^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L) \succcurlyeq_L U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$$

for all $C \in \xi_s$. By way of contradiction let us suppose that there is a coalition $N^* \subseteq N$ with $|N^*| = n^* \geq \frac{n}{s}$ such that $|\odot_{j \in N^*} v^j| \geq 1$ and $v^j C^L = 0$ for all $j \in N^*$. That is, no candidate supported by any voter in N^* is selected.

It is easy to verify that for all $C \in \xi_s$,

$$U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C) = |\{j \in N : v^j C \neq 0\}| = n - |\{j \in N : v^j C = 0\}|$$

Then, $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L) \leq n - n^*$.

Consider the set of candidates rearranged in the following way: first the s candidates selected in C^L ordered in such a way that if $i < i'$ then $App(V, i) \geq App(V, i')$; next the candidate $s + 1$ is a candidate supported by all the voters in N^* ; and then the rest of candidates in any order.

For each $i \in K$ denote by

$$a_i(V, C) = |\{j \in N : v_i^j = 1, i' < i \rightarrow v_{i'}^j = 0\}|$$

that is, the number of voters supporting candidate i but none of the previous candidates.

We can compute $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L)$ as

$$U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L) = \sum_{i=1}^s a_i(V, C^L)$$

If for some $i \in C^L$, $a_i(V, C^L) < n^*$ we can consider the committee $C \in \xi_s$ formed by the candidates in C^L but changing candidate i for candidate $s + 1$. Then, $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C) > U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L)$ because n^* voters support candidate $s + 1$ and fewer voters support i .

Then for all $i \in K$, $a_i(V, C^L) \geq n^*$ and consequently

$$U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L) = \sum_{i=1}^s a_i(V, C^L) \geq \sum_{i=1}^s n^* = sn^* \geq s \frac{n}{s} = n$$

A contradiction because as we have seen $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C^L) \leq n - n^*$. Therefore, the LUAV rule satisfies JR. ■

4. Final comments

Aziz et al. (2015) define a stronger version of the JR axiom that they refer to as *Extended Justified Representation* (EJR). EJR conveys the idea that a very large group of voters with similar preferences may deserve several representatives. Sánchez-Fernández et al. (2016) propose a modification of EJR, *Proportional Justified Representation* (PJR) with the same objective. Both properties are related to proportionality and not to the fact that the largest number of voters obtain representation. The LUAV rule does not fulfill even EJR or PJR. Example 2 in Aziz et al. (2015) shows this fact.

Example 2. (*Example 2 in Aziz et al. (2015)*) One hundred voters have to choose a three-member committee from four candidates, $K = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Ninety-eight voters approve candidates 1 and 2, one voter approves only candidate 3 and the last voter approves only candidate 4.

The LUAV rule proposes committees $\{1, 3, 4\}$ or $\{2, 3, 4\}$ which violate EJR and PJR.

In contexts looking for the widest representativeness of a committee, α -unanimity for positive values of α is an appealing property. It is, in some way, related to threshold rules (Fishburn and Pekeč (2004)) in the sense that the main goal is to select a committee that represents the largest number of voters while the relative numbers of agents supporting each candidate are ignored. Threshold rules also take into account interdependencies among candidates and then they provide, in general, different committees to that provided by the LUAV rule, as the following example shows (Kilgour, 2010).

Example 3. (*Example 2 in Kilgour (2010)*) Nine voters have to choose a three-member committee from 8 candidates, $K = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}$. Table 3 shows the voters' ballot profile.

The LUAV rule selects the committee $\{2, 3, 4\}$, but the thresholds solutions in Kilgour (2010) select $\{1, 2, 3\}$.

| # Voters | Candidates | | | | | | | |
|----------|------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 9 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Table 3: Example 3 ballots sincere profile.

Another property usually studied in voting mechanisms is strategy-proofness. As can be seen in Example 4, the LUAV rule can be manipulated.

Example 4. *Thirty voters have to choose a two-member committee from four candidates. Let $K = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$. Table 4 shows the voters' sincere ballot profile and Table 5 the voters' insincere ballot profile, where one voter has hidden his support for Candidate 1.*

| # Voters | Candidates | | | |
|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 9 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 30 | 21 | 19 | 18 | 2 |

Table 4: Example 4 ballots sincere profile.

The vectors $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ for both voting profiles are displayed in Tables 6 and 7 respectively.

| # Voters | Candidates | | | |
|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 30 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 2 |

Table 5: Example 4 ballots insincere profile.

| $C \in \xi_2$ | $\vec{\alpha}_s = (0, \frac{1}{2}, 1)$ | | |
|---------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|
| | $U_1^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ | $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ | $U_3^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ |
| (1, 1, 0, 0) | 30 | 30 | 10 |
| (1, 0, 1, 0) | 30 | 30 | 9 |
| (1, 0, 0, 1) | 30 | 21 | 2 |
| (0, 1, 1, 0) | 30 | 28 | 9 |
| (0, 1, 0, 1) | 30 | 21 | 0 |
| (0, 0, 1, 1) | 30 | 20 | 0 |

Table 6: $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ vectors for sincere ballot profile in Table 4.

| $C \in \xi_2$ | $\vec{\alpha}_s = (0, \frac{1}{2}, 1)$ | | |
|---------------|--|------------------------|------------------------|
| | $U_1^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ | $U_2^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ | $U_3^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ |
| (1, 1, 0, 0) | 30 | 29 | 10 |
| (1, 0, 1, 0) | 30 | 30 | 9 |
| (1, 0, 0, 1) | 30 | 20 | 2 |
| (0, 1, 1, 0) | 30 | 28 | 9 |
| (0, 1, 0, 1) | 30 | 21 | 0 |
| (0, 0, 1, 1) | 30 | 20 | 1 |

Table 7: $U^{\alpha_s}(V, C)$ vectors for insincere ballot profile in Table 5.

For the sincere profile in Table 4, the LUAV rule selects the committee $\{1, 2\}$ but when one voter of the first type hides his support for Candidate 1, the LUAV rule selects $\{1, 3\}$ which coincides with this voter’s sincere preference.

In political contexts there is not special interest in the strategic aspects of voting systems. The importance of the strategy-proofness has been discussed in the literature and in problems with a large number of voters it is usual to assume that voters will not be interested in manipulation because it may be difficult and risky for a voter to try to manipulate the final outcome if he does not exactly know the precise preferences of the other voters. Even in the case of his knowing all the preferences, he should consider the potential manipulation by the rest of voters.

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